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THE NON-LAWYER ATTORNEY GENERAL:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Andrew Flavelle Martin*
Introduction
The Attorney General is the chief law officer of the Crown.1 Among other things, they
are “the official legal adviser of the Lieutenant Governor, and the legal member of the
Executive Council”; “shall advise the heads of the several departments upon all
matters of law”; and “ha[ve] the regulation and conduct of all litigation for or against
the Crown”.2 These duties unquestionably constitute the practice of law. With some
exceptions, the unlicensed practice of law is an offence.3 The purpose of licensing,
along with the rest of the self-regulation of the legal profession, is to protect the public
interest.4 Nonetheless, some Attorneys General are not licensed as lawyers, which is
to say that they are not members of the corresponding law society. As Graham Steele
asks, “Does it matter?”.5 More specifically, does this leave unprotected the interests of
the government as client – or, more importantly, the public interest? Yes, indeed it
does.

*

Of the Ontario Bar; Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. Thanks to Adam
Dodek, Michelle Bérubé, Kim Brooks, Richard Devlin, Senator Judith Keating, and Nicole Arski for
comments on a draft. Thanks also to Emma Paquette at the Canadian Bar Association and Denise Fiset at
the Canadian Bar Association (New Brunswick Branch).
1

See e.g. Ontario v Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 at para 35: “As Chief Law
Officer of the Crown, the Attorney General has special responsibilities to uphold the administration of
justice”.

2

Public Service Act, RSNS 1989, c 376, s 29(1) (a), (c), (e). The language is very similar across Canadian
jurisdictions. See e.g. Department of Justice Act, RSC 1985, c J-2, ss 4, 5; Ministry of the Attorney General
Act, RSO 1990, c M.17, s 5; Attorney General Act, RSBC 1996, c 22, s 2; An Act Respecting the Role of the
Attorney General, RSNB 2011, c 116, s 2.

3

See e.g. Legal Profession Act, SNS 2004, c 28, s 17(1)(a).

4

See e.g. ibid, s 4(1): “The purpose of the Society is to uphold and protect the public interest in the practice
of law.” See also e.g. Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada 1993) (loose-leaf updated 2021, release 3) at Ch 26, 26.1, p 26–1: “[t]he
purposes of law society discipline proceedings are not to punish offenders and exact retribution, but rather
to protect the public, maintain high professional standards, and preserve public confidence in the legal
profession.” See also e.g. The Law Society of Manitoba v Bueti, 2018 MBLS 4 at para 4: “the purpose of a
discipline hearing is to protect the public interest.”

5

Graham Steele, “Is There a Lawyer in the House? The Declining Role of Lawyers in Elected Office”
(2017) 40:4 Can Parl Rev 2 at 7, online (pdf):<www.revparl.ca/40/4/40n4e_17_steele.pdf>.
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The long-running assumption and assertion in the case law and literature was
that the Attorney General is not required to be a lawyer. In 2013, the BC Court of
Appeal in Askin v Law Society of British Columbia squarely confirmed this
assumption.6 This holding, despite its important consequences for the public interest
and its aftermath, has been the subject of little analysis in the subsequent case law or
literature. These consequences thus remain not only unaddressed, but also largely
unacknowledged.
In this article, I provide a legal and policy analysis of the non-lawyer Attorney
General and recommendations for legislative change. I begin in Part 1 by setting out
and assessing Askin and its uptake in the case law and literature. I demonstrate that
while the decision in Askin has two major weaknesses, the reasoning is presumably
applicable across the country.7 In Part 2, I examine the legal consequences of Askin
and its policy or practical consequences. I argue that it threatens the government’s
solicitor-client privilege and that it leaves the non-lawyer Attorney General
unconstrained by the law of lawyering more broadly. Against this context, in Part 3 I
consider options for legislative reform and propose a path forward that will solve the
legal consequences of Askin. I recommend legislative amendments that would deem
the non-lawyer Attorney General to be a member of the corresponding law society so
long as they held that role. I then conclude by reflecting on the implications of my
analysis. If nothing else, such legislative deeming would clearly identify the
reasonable expectations of the legislature and the public, as well as signal to law
societies that the regulation of the legal profession must unavoidably include
regulation of the Attorney General. I also recommend the recognition of a
constitutional convention that only lawyers be appointed as Attorney General.
Part 1: Askin v Law Society of British Columbia and its uptake
In this Part, I canvass and critique the holding and rationale in Askin and situate the
case in the previous and subsequent legal literature and caselaw.
The petitioner in Askin unsuccessfully argued that the appointment of a nonlawyer as Attorney General was invalid and that the non-lawyer Attorney General was
violating the prohibition against the unlicensed practice of law under the Legal
Profession Act.8 She also argued that other provincial legislation, including legislation
6
Askin v Law Society of British Columbia, 2013 BCCA 233 [Askin BCCA], aff’g 2012 BCSC 895 [Askin
BCSC], leave to appeal to SCC refused, 35463 (7 November 2013).
7

While the reasoning is partly reliant on a provincial statute, the relevant statutory language is not unique
to BC. See below note 62 and accompanying text.
8

Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at paras 1, 7; Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at para 11. Indeed, on appeal she argued
not only that the Legal Profession Act, SBC 1998, c 9, required the Attorney General to be a lawyer (Askin
BCCA at para 50), but further that the Queen’s Counsel Act, RSBC 1996, c 393, required the Attorney
General to have been a lawyer for five years (Askin BCCA at para 47). It is unclear from the reasons in
Askin BCSC whether she made this argument before the chambers judge.
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on the office of the Attorney General, similarly required that the Attorney General be
a lawyer.9
The petitioner also argued, likewise unsuccessfully, that the Law Society had
erred in its decision that it lacked “jurisdiction” to investigate her complaint against
the non-lawyer Attorney General for unlicensed practice.10 The reaction of the Law
Society to the decision of the Court of Appeal was that “[t]he law society is content to
have the matter once again resolved and to have confirmation of our interpretation of
the Legal Profession Act and other statutes.”11
The core holding in Askin can be broken down into two linked propositions.
The first is a matter of constitutional law: the unconstrained ability to appoint members
of cabinet, including the Attorney General, is a prerogative power.12 The second
proposition, which is a question of statutory interpretation, is that BC legislation –
including the Legal Profession Act – had not displaced that prerogative power.13 In
particular, the Interpretation Act deems that a statutory assignment of duties includes
the necessary powers to fulfill those duties.14
In arriving at this decision, each level of court made a notable observation.
Justice Stromberg-Stein of the Supreme Court of BC held that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, “statutes imposing duties on a minister of the Crown cannot be read as
requiring that in order to perform their duties, the minister must obtain additional
authority under a statute of general application, such as the Legal Profession Act.”15
The Court of Appeal, considering a statutory interpretation argument applying the
concept of necessary implication, adopted the position of the Attorney General that
“[i]t is not necessary for the purpose of protecting the general public, the purpose of

9

Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 22; Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at paras 44–45, 50.

10

Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 12, 16, 26.

11

Charlotte Santry, “AG doesn’t need to be a lawyer: B.C. appeal court” (8 May 2013) online: Canadian
Lawyer Magazine <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/general/ag-doesnt-need-to-be-a-lawyer-b.c.appeal-court/271985> (quoting Deborah Armour, the Society’s chief legal officer).

12

Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at paras 29–30: “The prerogative power of the Lieutenant Governor to appoint
ministers of cabinet is of constitutional significance, and cannot be removed, replaced, qualified, or
extinguished without express legislative language or by necessary implication…. Further, as the royal
prerogative is a branch of the common law, the legislature would need clear and unambiguous indication
that it intended to change it”. [Citations omitted.] See also Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at para 31.

13

Legal Profession Act, supra note 8; Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at paras 22–26; Askin BCCA, supra note
6 esp at para 50.

14

Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 23, quoting Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238, s 27(2) [BC
Interpretation Act]: “If in an enactment power is given to a person to do or enforce the doing of an act or
thing, all the powers that are necessary to enable the person to do or enforce the doing of the act or thing are
also deemed to be given.” See also Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at para 45.

15

Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 24.
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the Legal Profession Act, that the person appointed to the office of Attorney General
be a member of the Law Society, or even that the person be legally trained.”16
Neither level of court otherwise engaged with the petitioner’s submissions
that the public interest required the Attorney General to be a lawyer, i.e. that
“[p]rinciples of the public interest in the administration of justice also militate against
a non-lawyer holding office as Attorney General” and that “[s]erious harm to the rights
of individual citizens of the province is a very real risk where an unqualified person is
appointed to the office of the Attorney General.”17
Although not mentioned in Askin, a similar question was superficially
answered in the 1919 decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Rex v Nyczyk.18 The
appellant in Nyczyk argued that the indictment was invalid because it was preferred
under the authority of the acting Attorney General, who was not a lawyer.19 However,
the Court held that “[t]here is nothing in the statutes that I can find requiring the
Attorney-General to be a barrister or a solicitor, although the holder of that office
usually is a barrister.”20 (Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate or otherwise
support this statement with any legal analysis.) Moreover, Purdue CJM applied the
proposition that “[i]t is a general presumption of law that a person acting in a public
capacity is duly authorized so to do”.21 This proposition appears to parallel the
interpretive argument in Askin that statutory duties include the power to carry out those
duties.
Similarly, MacKenzie J in Krieger v Law Society of Alberta asserted, without
giving any support, that “an Attorney General does not have to be a lawyer”.22
Moreover, presaging the interpretation of the BC Legal Profession Act in Askin, she
also asserted that “the intent and purpose of that Act [the Alberta Legal Profession
Act] is to control the standards of lawyers. It is not in any way concerned with the
functions of the Attorney General as such.”23 While the Supreme Court of Canada
affirmed the result in Krieger, it made no comment on these parts of the reasons of
MacKenzie J.

16

Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at para 50.

17

Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at paras 2(f), 2(g).

18

Rex v Nyczyk (1919), 30 Man R 17, 31 CCC 240 (CA) [Nyczyk cited to Man R].

19

Ibid at 18–19.

20

Ibid at 19, Perdue CJM. See also Cameron JA at 22: “That [the acting Attorney General] the Honourable
T. C. Norris was not a lawyer is immaterial.”
21

Ibid at 19 [citation omitted].

22

Krieger v Law Society of Alberta (1997), 149 DLR (4th) 92 at para 72, 51 Alta LR (3d) 363 (QB) [Krieger
QB], rev’d on other grounds 2000 ABCA 255, aff’d on other grounds 2002 SCC 65 [Krieger SCC].
23

Krieger QB, supra note 22 at para 72; Legal Profession Act, SA 1990, c L-9.1.
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The assumption in almost all of the literature prior to Askin was that the
Attorney General was not required to be a lawyer. For example, David Kilgour wrote
in 1979 that “[t]he Attornies General of both our federal and provincial governments
need not be lawyers but invariably have been since one’s mind runneth not to the
contrary.”24 Similarly, Grant Huscroft in 1995 noted that “[i]n Canada, however, it is
clear not only that the Attorney General might not be the best lawyer; the Attorney
General might not be a lawyer at all.”25 However, neither Kilgour nor Huscroft cited
any legal support for their assertions, instead merely observing the fact that nonlawyers had occasionally been appointed as Attorneys General.26 As noted by Michael
B. Murphy, former Attorney General for New Brunswick, this fact is “irrelevant….
[t]he appointments simply have not been challenged.”27
A more nuanced position was taken on behalf of the New Brunswick Branch
of the Canadian Bar Association in 1987: “Given the nature of these duties and
functions [of the Attorney General] it will be seen that only in exceptional
circumstances could the office be discharged by one who is not a lawyer.”28
Unfortunately this assertion was not explained. In particular, there was no indication
of what might qualify as such “exceptional circumstances”.29 Neither was it clear
whether the assertion was squarely one of law or one of policy, or both.
Many decades before any of this literature, however, W. Kent Power in a
1939 note in the Canadian Bar Review squarely considered the arguments that the
Attorney General must be a lawyer as a matter of law and policy.30 Power’s motivation
was the appointment of a non-lawyer Attorney General for Alberta in 1937, which
Power identifies as likely the first such non-lawyer Attorney General in Canadian
history.31 Intriguingly, Power’s legal analysis largely foreshadowed Askin. Like the
applicant in Askin, Power recognized a legal argument based on the legislation
governing the practice of law and the office of the Attorney General – but, like the
courts in Askin, he recognized the impact of the prerogative power (the scope of which

24

David Kilgour, “Editorial Note to Lord Hailsham’s “Lecture on the Law Officers and the Lord
Chancellor”” (1979) 17:2 Alta L Rev 141 at 141.

25

Grant Huscroft, “The Attorney General and Charter Challenges to Legislation: Advocate or Adjudicator?”
(1995) 5 NJCL 125 at 134. (Now Huscroft JA of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.)

26

Kilgour, supra note 24 at 141 (EC Manning, Alberta, 1955); Huscroft, supra note 25 at 135 note 36 (James
MacRae, Manitoba, 1988; Marion Boyd, Ontario, 1993).

27

Michael B Murphy QC, “The Case for an Unelected and Independent Attorney General” (November
2013) Solicitors’ J 1 at 10 [on file with author].

28

Hon Charles JA Hughes et al, “The Future of the Office of Attorney-General in New Brunswick” (1988)
37 UNBLJ 190 at 190 [Hughes et al].

29

Ibid at 190.

30

W Kent Power, “The Office of Attorney General” (1939) 17:6 Can Bar Rev 416.

31

Ibid at 416.
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power he described as being “very nebulous” at the time).32 Also like Askin, Power
suggested that as a matter of policy, a non-lawyer Attorney General would not be
capable of effectively performing the duties of office and would thus endanger the
public interest (in Power’s words, “the public welfare”).33
The uptake of Askin in the subsequent legal literature and the case law has
been minimal. Only two cases have applied it, and they have only done so for fairly
narrow propositions that are far from unique to Askin. The Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench has relied on Askin for the proposition that “[i]n order to amend Crown
Prerogative, the Legislature must express its intent in a clear and unambiguous
manner”.34 Similarly, the BC Supreme Court has cited Askin, among other decisions,
in holding that “[t]he object of the Legal Profession Act is the protection of the
public”.35
The few commentators that have cited Askin have at most critiqued its result
but not its reasoning. Adam Dodek described Askin as “surprising[g]” and “strange”.36
However, he went no further. Indeed, he wrote soon after that “[p]remiers have the
power and the right to appoint non-lawyers as their chief legal advisers.”37 Similarly,
while Graham Steele observed that “[w]hen the Attorney General is not a lawyer, one
may wonder in what meaningful sense he or she can offer legal advice to the
government,”38 he did not argue that Askin was problematic or wrong. Likewise, in
analyzing the application of solicitor-client privilege to the non-lawyer Attorney
General, I myself applied Askin without any critique.39

32
Ibid at 418–422. See esp 422: “that contention brings us again into that very nebulous realm of the scope
of the royal prerogative”.
33

Ibid at 424–429.

34

Engel v Alberta (Executive Council), 2019 ABQB 490 at para 32. But see below note 51 on displacement
of a prerogative power by necessary implication.
35

Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP v Cardero Resource Corp, 2014 BCSC 892 at para 18.

36

Adam Dodek, “The Curious Case of the Non-Lawyer Attorney General: White Tiger of the Legal System”
(29 May 2013), online (blog): SLAW <www.slaw.ca/2013/05/29/the-curious-case-of-the-non-lawyerattorney-general-white-tiger-of-the-legal-system/> [Dodek, “White Tiger”]: “It seems strange that the
occupant of the highest legal office of the province could be a non-lawyer. It seems strange further still that
this person is charged by statute with many important legal responsibilities, including acting as the official
legal adviser to the Lieutenant Governor and to the Cabinet.” See also Omar Ha-Redeye, “Possibilities
Under a Non-Lawyer AG in Ontario” (1 July 2018), online (blog): SLAW
<www.slaw.ca/2018/07/01/possibilities-under-a-non-lawyer-ag-in-ontario/>: “it may seem as an
inconsistency”.
37

Adam Dodek, “Does Solicitor-Client Privilege Apply to an Attorney-General Who Is Not a Lawyer?” (6
August 2013), online (blog): SLAW <www.slaw.ca/2013/08/06/does-solicitor-client-privilege-apply-to-anattorney-general-who-is-not-a-lawyer/> [Dodek, “Solicitor-Client Privilege”].
38
39

Steele, supra note 5 at 7.

Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Attorney General as Lawyer (?): Confidentiality upon Resignation from
Cabinet” (2015) 38:1 Dal LJ 147 at 166–169 [Martin, “Confidentiality”].
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Notably, the commentators who have more fully critiqued Askin have all
come out of the government of New Brunswick: government lawyer Eric Boucher,
former Deputy Attorney General Judith Keating, and former Attorney General
Michael B. Murphy.40 In his analysis of the role of the Attorney General as “lore
master” of the rule of law, Boucher expressed in passing “grave concern” with Askin.41
In an unpublished speech that drew on an article by Murphy, Keating similarly
characterized Askin as “a most unfortunate case”.42 Murphy went further, writing that
the holding in Askin “defies all logic”.43 Like Murphy, Keating argued that “[t]he
powers of the Executive Council Office to appoint a minister and assign responsibility,
and the constitutional imperative for appointing the chief legal advisor are not
mutually exclusive, and to accept such a proposition is to negate the fundamental role
of the Attorney General and along with it the proper application of the rule of law.”44
Indeed, Keating ranks non-lawyer Attorneys General as “[the] most flagrant erosion
of the role of the Attorney General”,45 and ultimately characterizes the appointment of
non-lawyer Attorneys General as a failure of the responsibility, and even the legal
duty, of the Premiers who appoint them.46 She called on lawyers, the Canadian Bar
Association, and the law societies to engage on this issue.47 Boucher likewise called
on law societies to do so:
My hope is also that law societies will be compelled to deal with the problem
of non-lawyer Attorneys General. By stressing the importance of appointing
only practicing lawyers to the top legal job of the jurisdiction, hopefully law
societies will be in a better position to impress upon government the
importance of its role as guardian of the rule of law and of the Attorney
General's role as its Lore Master.48
40

Recall also here the earlier view of the New Brunswick Branch of the Canadian Bar Association that the
Attorney General should be a lawyer absent undefined “exceptional circumstances”: Hughes et al, supra
note 28.

41

Eric Pierre Boucher, “Civil Crown Counsel: Lore Masters of the Rule of Law” (2018) 12 JPPL 463 at
483. Boucher here echoed the “grave concern” of Judith Keating, then a former Deputy Attorney General
for New Brunswick and now Senator Keating: Judith Keating, QC, “The Role of the Attorney General: A
Crisis of Conscience” (27 April 2017), online: Canadian Bar Association, Teleconference [membership
required]: <www.cba.org/Sections/Public-Sector-Lawyers-Forum/Resources/MP3/TeleconferenceOct1916-(5)> [on file with author].

42

Ibid at 50:05 to 50:07; Murphy, supra note 27 at 10.

43

Murphy, supra note 27 at 12.

44

Keating, supra note 41 at 50:43 to 51:09; Murphy, supra note 27 at 10.

45

Keating, supra note 41 at 48:13 to 48:25.

46

Ibid at 44.06 to 45:04: “as fiduciaries and trustees of the constitutional makeup of their respective
jurisdictions, Premiers have an obligation to ensure that the institutions as established serve to facilitate the
provision of independent legal advice and protect the exercise of the fundamental role of the Attorney
General. To do otherwise, in my view, by … appointing non-lawyers as Attorneys General and non-lawyers
as Deputies Attorney General … is to allow for the rule of law to be overridden by political imperatives.”

47

Ibid at 59:41 to 59:50.

48

Boucher, supra note 41 at 484.
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There is no indication, at least publicly, that law societies have fulfilled Keating’s plea
or Boucher’s hope. In my view this is not surprising, as law societies – in contrast to,
for example, the Canadian Bar Association and its branches – seem reticent to engage
with such issues. Moreover, the court in Askin held that the law society was correct
that it had no jurisdiction over the appointment of a non-lawyer Attorney General.49
This holding would provide a defensible justification for the law societies to avoid
addressing this problem. It is less obvious why the Canadian Bar Association appears
not to have addressed it, at least publicly.
Adam Dodek has suggested that the existence of non-lawyer Attorneys
General is largely ignored by the profession because it is a threat to “some of the most
fundamental assertions of the Canadian legal system”, particularly the self-regulation
and the professional monopoly of the legal profession.50 This would be a compelling
rationale to ignore Askin, albeit a self-serving one – although following this reasoning
one might expect lawyers to argue that Askin was wrongly decided and that Attorneys
General must be lawyers.
As for the reasoning in Askin, it has two major weaknesses. With respect, I
would argue that the least supported and most vulnerable conclusion by the Court of
Appeal was that the public interest mandate of the law society does not, by necessary
implication, grant the law society jurisdiction over the Attorney General.51 If the public
interest requires the law society to regulate government lawyers, as the Supreme Court
of Canada established in Krieger,52 then it is unclear as to why it would not require the
regulation of the Attorney General as the chief government lawyer.53 (I do
acknowledge that on a narrow reading, Krieger holds that the Law Society has this
authority “[b]ecause Crown prosecutors must be members of the Law Society” –
suggesting that Krieger itself does not assist in determining whether Attorneys General
must likewise be members.)54 More detailed reasoning would have been helpful from
the courts in Askin on this point.
49
Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 26. Askin BCCA, supra note 6 notes this argument at para 23 but does
not explicitly consider it.
50

Dodek, “White Tiger”, supra note 36.

51
With respect to the chambers judge, she may have overstated her holding at para 30 that “as the royal
prerogative is a branch of the common law, the legislature would need clear and unambiguous indication
that it intended to change it”. A prerogative power can be displaced by necessary implication. See e.g. Ross
River Dena Council v Canada, 2002 SCC 54 at para 54, as quoted e.g. by Askin BCCA at para 32 [citations
omitted]: “this displacement [of a prerogative power] occurs only to the extent that the statute does so
explicitly or by necessary implication”. See also Canadian Federation of Students v Ontario, 2019 ONSC
6658 at para 94 (Div Ct): “The Crown cannot exercise its prerogative powers in a manner contrary to
legislation or in circumstances where legislation has displaced the Crown’s prerogative power explicitly or
by necessary implication.”
52

Krieger SCC, supra note 23 at para 58.

53

Thanks to Senator Keating for inspiring this point.

54

Krieger SCC, supra note 23 at para 4.
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The second major weakness in Askin is the assumed scope of the prerogative
power to appoint the Attorney General. Keating and Murphy both make an important
argument that the power to appoint the Cabinet must be interpreted alongside the duty
of the Attorney General as chief law officer, and that the former does not trump the
latter.55 Indeed, insofar as the Attorney General has a duty to promote and protect the
rule of law, and the rule of law is a constitutional principle,56 the prerogative power is
arguably constrained by that principle.57 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada in
Krieger recognized that “the office of the Attorney General is one with constitutional
dimensions recognized in the Constitution Act, 1867”.58 That is, there are legitimate
constitutional reasons to require the Attorney General to be a lawyer, which reasons
legitimately constrain the otherwise absolute discretion to appoint the Cabinet. This
argument is about the scope of the prerogative power and not its displacement by
statute – and thus, if accepted, renders moot the statutory interpretation issue about
displacement, which was the focus of the Court of Appeal in Askin. Nonetheless,
explicit legal support for this argument about the scope of the prerogative power
appears to be lacking. In contrast, courts have zealously protected undisplaced
prerogative powers,59 which zeal suggests that they may be unlikely to recognize an
apparently novel constraint on the prerogative power to appoint the Attorney General.
Unfortunately, this argument was not raised before the chambers judge or on the
appeal.60
While Askin is not binding on courts outside British Columbia, its reasoning
would appear to be applicable elsewhere. While the first proposition – that the
unconstrained ability to appoint members of cabinet, including the Attorney General,
is a prerogative power – applies across Canada, the question of whether that
prerogative power has been displaced by statute is a matter of statutory interpretation
that could conceivably vary from province to province. Steele, for example, writes that
“[t]he BC Court of Appeal decision relies on some very careful interpretation of
several BC statutes, so it is not clear that the case puts the issue to rest for the rest of

55

Keating, supra note 41 at 50:43 to 51:09; Murphy, supra note 27 at 10–12.

56

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at paras 70–71, 161 DLR (4th) 385.

57

Murphy, supra note 27 at 10, 12. Murphy roots his rule of law argument in the preamble to the Constitution
Act, 1982 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.

58

Krieger, supra note 22 at para 26; Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985,
Appendix II, No 5.

59
60

See e.g. Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3 at paras 34–37.

Askin BCCA, supra note 6 at para 11: “Ms. Askin filed a factum raising numerous grounds of appeal and
seeking a number of orders. Counsel appeared for Ms. Askin on the hearing of the appeal, and properly
limited the grounds of appeal and the nature of the order sought.” Even a generous reading of the appellate
factum, however, does not reveal this particular constitutional argument. Moreover, no notice of
constitutional question was given: Askin BCSC, supra note 6 at para 31.
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Canada.”61 Nonetheless, the key provision in the BC Interpretation Act – that the
imposition of a duty includes the powers necessary to execute that duty – is a fairly
typical one.62 At the same time, any courts outside BC purporting to rely on or follow
Askin as persuasive would be wise to address the two weaknesses in its reasoning
discussed above.
In her unsuccessful application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada, Askin made the novel but intriguing and compelling argument that there is a
Canadian constitutional convention that only lawyers be appointed Attorney
General.63 Under this argument, the few past appointments of non-lawyer Attorneys
General become rare exceptions to a convention instead of evidence that such
appointments are lawful. Whether this argument is correct depends on the three-part
test from the Patriation Reference as re-stated in Conacher v Canada (Prime
Minister): “first, what are the precedents; second, did the actors in the precedents
believe that they were bound by a rule; and third, is there a reason for the rule?”64 The
first part of the test is clearly met, as there are numerous precedents. The third part,
the reason for the rule, will become clear in Part 2 – in short, that the Attorney General
can adequately uphold the rule of law and fulfill their other duties only if they are a
lawyer. The second part of the test, whether the appointing premiers felt they were
required to appoint only lawyers as Attorneys General, does not seem to be in serious
doubt. In particular, why else would premiers almost always appoint lawyers as
Attorneys General?65 The few exceptions would appear to prove the rule.
While Askin was perhaps correct, and its underlying reasoning is presumably
applicable across Canada, it nonetheless has undesirable legal and policy
consequences. Before turning to these consequences, I note that insofar as the power
of appointment at issue in Askin is indeed a prerogative power, it can be constrained
or removed by the legislature.

61

Steele, supra note 5 at 8.

62

See e.g. Interpretation Act, RSNS 1989, c 235, s 19(b): “In an enactment, …where power is given to the
Governor in Council or a public officer to do or enforce the doing of any act, all necessary powers are also
given to enable him to do or enforce the doing of the act”; Federal Interpretation Act, supra note 51, s 31(2):
“Where power is given to a person, officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing of any act or thing, all
such powers as are necessary to enable the person, officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing of the
act or thing are deemed to be also given.”; Legislation Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 21, s 78: “If power to do or to
enforce the doing of a thing is conferred on a person, all necessary incidental powers are included.”
63

Askin, supra note 6, Application for Leave to Appeal at 34–46, Memorandum of Argument (31 July 2013)
(Supreme Court of Canada, 35463) at paras 4046 [on file with author] [Askin SCC leave application].
64
Conacher v Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FC 920 at para 37, aff’d 2010 FCA 131 at para 12, citing Re:
Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753 at 888, 125 DLR (3d) 1 [Patriation Reference].
65

See above note 23 and accompanying text. See also Askin SCC leave application, supra note 63, at 65–
70 (four non-lawyers appointed Attorney General in the history of British Columbia, including the Attorney
General whose appointment was being challenged), 71–77 (one non-lawyer (Acting) Attorney General in
the history of Canada, including Upper Canada and Lower Canada).
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Part 2: The legal and policy consequences of Askin
In this Part, I assess the legal and policy consequences of Askin, consequences that on
balance are negative for the government and for the public. While at first glance it may
appear that the most important consequence is that the non-lawyer Attorney General
lacks adequate legal training and experience, it is the discrete legal consequences that
I argue are more problematic.
Perhaps the most important legal consequence of Askin, at least for
governments, is uncertainty over whether solicitor-client privilege applies to
communications involving a non-lawyer Attorney General. While this point has never
been decided by a court or tribunal, there is disagreement in the literature. Adam
Dodek has argued that solicitor-client privilege would not apply, because a non-lawyer
Attorney General is not a “professional legal advisor” following Wigmore’s test.66 In
contrast, John Gregory has argued that the conduit exception applies to the non-lawyer
Attorney General conveying advice from their Ministry to the Cabinet.67 Similarly to
Gregory, Tom D. McKinlay argues that “Attorneys General rely almost exclusively
on the legal advice prepared by the expert counsel employed in the Department of
Justice. The communication of such advice would clearly be covered by solicitorclient privilege, even if conveyed by an Attorney General who is not personally a
lawyer…. [because] [s]olicitor-client privilege is not lost when it is communicated
among non-lawyers within the government.”68 McKinlay nonetheless acknowledges
that “in those rare cases that a non-lawyer Attorney General communicates their
personal advice, divorced from the advice of his or her officials, … any question of
privilege would arise”.69 In contrast, I have argued elsewhere that the Attorney General
alone is a lawyer – i.e. a professional legal adviser – without being a member of the
bar.70 Under my approach, their legal advice would be privileged whether or not they
were conveying it from their departmental lawyers or providing it personally. This
disagreement has yet to be resolved in the case law and, with respect to McKinlay, I
am unconvinced that the issue “is largely academic”.71
The most important legal consequence of Askin, in terms of the public
interest, is that the non-lawyer Attorney General is not bound by the law of lawyering
more generally, including but not limited to duties under the rules of professional
conduct. Indeed, the law society has no regulatory authority over the non-lawyer

66

Adam M Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at paras 4.28–4.34;
Dodek, “Solicitor-Client Privilege”, supra note 37.

67

Martin, “Confidentiality”, supra note 39 at 166–169. But see below note 83 and accompanying text.
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Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Crown, “Crown Privilege: Solicitor-Client Privilege: The Solicitor”
(IX.1.(2)) at HCW-22 “Non-Lawyer Attorney General” (2021 Re-issue) [citations omitted] [McKinlay].

69

Ibid.
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Martin, “Confidentiality”, supra note 39 at 166–169.

71

McKinlay, supra note 68.
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Attorney General and so its rules have no application to them.72 Admittedly, many of
these professional duties are owed to the client, and the government as client is
unlikely to complain to the law society about the Attorney General regardless – indeed,
the premier has the immediate and ever-present option of simply removing the
individual acting as Attorney General from Cabinet or shuffling them into another
portfolio. Client complaints are admittedly not a formal prerequisite for law society
investigation or discipline. Lawyers have other overarching duties than those owed to
the client, including civility and the duty to encourage respect for the administration
of justice.73 Sadly, not all Attorneys General have fulfilled these duties.74 Moreover,
the Supreme Court of Canada held in Krieger that law society authority over Crown
prosecutors is necessary to protect the public interest.75 As I mentioned above, similar
considerations would apply to the Attorney General.76 While even a lawyer Attorney
General enjoys some statutory and constitutional immunities to law society discipline,
those immunities are – and should be – narrow.77 It is for this reason that, as I
mentioned above, I respectfully question the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that
“[i]t is not necessary for the purpose of protecting the general public, the purpose of
the Legal Profession Act, that the person appointed to the office of Attorney General
be a member of the Law Society”.78 At the same time, I acknowledge the argument
that law society jurisdiction over the Attorney General has an undesirable chilling
effect over the execution of their duties.79 On balance, my view is that law society
jurisdiction over the Attorney General, whether a lawyer or not, is an unavoidable
element of the regulation of the legal profession in the public interest. Moreover, any
negative impact of a chilling effect is outweighed by the positive impact of law society
jurisdiction.
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Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Immunity of the Attorney General to Law Society Discipline” (2016) 94:2
Can Bar Rev 413 at 426, n 60 [Martin, “Immunity”]. See also Krieger QB, supra note 23 at para 72:
“Because of the fact that an Attorney General does not have to be a lawyer, that official may well escape
the disciplinary scrutiny of the Legal Profession Act. That is of no concern because the intent and purpose
of that Act is to control the standards of lawyers. It is not in any way concerned with the functions of the
Attorney General as such. The Attorney General, although an Honourary Bencher, need not be a lawyer. An
Attorney General, not a lawyer, would of course never be subject to any scrutiny by the Law Society. That
situation is reasonable because the purpose of the Legal Profession Act is to govern the conduct of lawyers
not that of Attorneys General.”
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Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa: FLSC, 2009, last
amended 2019), rr 5.6-1, 7.2-1, online: Federation of Law Societies of Canada <www.flsc.ca> [FLSC Model
Code].
74

See e.g. Brent Cotter, “The Prime Minister v the Chief Justice of Canada: The Attorney General’s Failure
of Responsibility” (2015) 18 Leg Ethics 73, discussing federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General
Peter MacKay.
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Krieger SCC, supra note 23 at para 58.
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See above note 52. See also Martin, “Immunity”, supra note 72 at 443.
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Ibid at 422–439.
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See above note 16.
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Martin, “Immunity”, supra note 72 at 440–442.
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An interesting consequence of Askin is that the non-lawyer Attorney General
has no professional duty of competence.80 If I am correct that the non-lawyer Attorney
General practices law despite not being a member of the law society,81 they may
nonetheless be liable in negligence.82 However, the duty of care would be likely be
owed solely to the client, and not to third parties or the public at large. The government
would be unlikely to pursue an action in negligence against its own Attorney General
– and even if it did so, it would likely be for political reasons. In contrast to the duty
of care in negligence, the professional duty of competence is enforceable by the law
society regardless of the wishes of the client. Following Askin, law societies would
have no ability to discipline non-lawyer Attorneys General for incompetence, among
other things.
The practical consequence of Askin is that it permits the appointment of an
Attorney General who, at least as a matter of training and experience, is unqualified
for the role. Power in 1939 argued that it is inappropriate and anemic for a non-lawyer
Attorney General to merely convey the advice of lawyers in their department:
The attorney-general should not be a mere conduit of the opinions of others,
and it is not possible for him to be anything but that if he is not learned in
the law. In order to come to any conclusion really worth while he must have
that instinct for the spirit of the law which can be acquired only from
professional learning and experience, and, in order to weigh the opinions of
his assistants and be qualified to discuss them and to convey the result which
to his own mind follows from them he must be able to think in legal terms
and to formulate his conclusions in accordance with those terms.83

Brian Smith, on his resignation in 1988 as Attorney General for British Columbia,
made a similar observation about non-lawyer Attorneys General: “I know from my
experience that the Attorney-General requires considerable legal and constitutional
sensibility in giving advice to government, or else the Attorney-General will simply
be repeating, without understanding, the legal advice of others.”84 Recall also that the
courts in Askin did not squarely address the petitioner’s submissions that a non-lawyer
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FLSC Model Code, supra note 73, r 3.1-2.

81

Martin, “Confidentiality”, supra note 39 at 166–169. See above note 70 and corresponding text.
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I recognize that, as the Model Code emphasizes, the standard of competence is not identical to negligence.
See FLSC Model Code, supra note 73, r 3.12, commentary 15: “This rule [competence] does not require a
standard of perfection. An error or omission, even though it might be actionable for damages in negligence
or contract, will not necessarily constitute a failure to maintain the standard of professional competence
described by the rule.”

83
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Power, supra note 30 at 426.

British Columbia, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly (Hansard), 34th Parl, 2nd Sess
(28 June 1988) at 5498 (Hon BR Smith), online: <www.leg.bc.ca/documents-data/debate-transcripts/34thparliament/2nd-session/34p_02s_880628p>. Thanks to Adam Dodek for reminding me of this part of
Smith’s speech.
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Attorney General endangers both the public interest and the rights of individuals.85
Moreover, the non-lawyer Attorney General has not been screened for character and
integrity as have lawyers, although admittedly the utility of that screening is
contested.86
At the same time, any requirement that the Attorney General be a lawyer,
even a lawyer in good standing, would be a meagre floor on competence and integrity,
and certainly on experience – but a floor nonetheless. One might dream of a worldclass constitutional litigator like Ian Scott but end up with an undistinguished recent
call.87 Power, though, somewhat poetically ended his analysis with the assertion that
at least a lawyer can “envisage the ideal at which he should aim”.88
In the abstract, all else equal, a lawyer Attorney General is arguably more
effective than a non-lawyer Attorney General. In reality, however, a mediocre lawyer
may be a failure and an otherwise exceptionally qualified non-lawyer may make a
highly effective Attorney General. For example, former Minister of Justice and
Attorney General for Canada, Anne McLellan, argued in 2018 that “thoughtful[ness]”
and “good judgment” are more important for an Attorney General than being a
lawyer.89 (McLellan would, however, go on to state in a 2019 report for the Prime
Minister’s Office that “the federal [Attorney General and Minister of Justice] has
always had legal training, and I believe that it is important to continue this tradition.”90)
Indeed, some commentators argue that a non-lawyer Attorney General may
be more effective than a lawyer – depending on how one defines effectiveness. For
example, Omar Ha-Redeye writes that “[s]ometimes lengthy experience in a
profession is the biggest obstacle to reforming that profession.”91 Similarly, former
85

See above note 17. Contrast B Schwarz & D Rettie, “Interview with Rick Mantey: Exposing the Invisible”
(2001) 28:2 Man LJ 187 at 191: “Did the whole administration of justice fall down when Jim McCrae [a
non-lawyer] was the Attorney General? I don't think so.”
86

See e.g. Alice Woolley, “Tending the Bar: The Good Character Requirement for Law Society Admission”
(2007) 30 Dal LJ 27.
87

See e.g. W Brent Cotter, “Ian Scott: Renaissance Man, Consummate Advocate, Attorney General
Extraordinaire” in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2015) 202.
88

Power, supra note 30 at 429.
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Fatima Sayed, “Mulroney’s reputation ‘on the line’, say critics, if she won’t oppose Ford on
notwithstanding clause” (18 August 2018), online: National Observer
<www.nationalobserver.com/2018/09/18/news/mulroneys-reputation-line-say-critics-if-she-wont-opposeford-notwithstanding-clause>.
90
The Hon A Anne McLellan, Review of the Roles of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada
(June 28, 2019) at 9 , online: Government of Canada
<pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2019/08/14/review-roles-minister-justice-and-attorney-generalcanada> [McLellan]. With great respect to McLellan, in my view membership in the provincial Bar (or, at
the federal level, membership in a provincial bar) is necessary as opposed to merely legal training.
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Ha-Redeye, supra note 36. See also comments by lawyer Clayton Ruby on the appointment of Marion
Boyd as Attorney General for Ontario: "She brings a new perspective and I think that's hopeful…. The only
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Ontario premier Bob Rae described his non-lawyer Attorney General, Marion Boyd,
as “an advocate for change”.92 Boyd herself said of her appointment that “I think what
we are saying -- and what the clear message from the government is -- is that the justice
system is not the prerogative of the legal profession only.”93 Shirley Bond, whose
appointment triggered Askin, suggested that “as a non-lawyer serving as Attorney
General, I bring a common-sense approach that most British Columbians can
appreciate”.94 More dramatically, Vic Toews argued that the adoption of
administrative measures against impaired driving in Manitoba was easier because the
non-lawyer Attorney General was not fixated on the requirements of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms:95
From the onset the greatest impediment to the development of this
administrative program was the objection by the legal community,
including my colleagues in the Manitoba Department of Justice, that this
initiative should not be pursued because it violated the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms…. The advantage that we had in developing this program
for the Province of Manitoba was that our Attorney General was not a
lawyer; rather, he could have been a model for the archetypal reasonable
man we used to read about in law school. His focus was not so much on
the Charter objections to the program that the legal community was intent
on providing but on finding a mechanism to protect the lives and property
of the people of Manitoba.96

Admittedly, a fixation on the Charter – even an undue one – might not be considered
a disadvantage by some. Contrast here Boyd, the non-lawyer Attorney General for
Ontario, who wanted her lawyers to confirm the constitutionality of such impaireddriving measures before she recommended them.97 A more fundamental concern than
question is, can she understand the legal issues? If she's bright, she'll have no difficulty." (Paul Moloney,
“Minister's lack of legal training may be an asset, lawyers say”, The Toronto Star (4 February 1993) A11.)
92

Bob Rae, From Protest to Power: Personal Reflections on a Life in Politics (Toronto: Viking, 1996) at
251.

93

Tom Onyshko, “Ontario's new Attorney General has ambitious plans for reform”, The Lawyers Weekly
12:40 (26 February 1993) (QL). See also Monique Conrod, “'We didn't think there would be any problem.
We really didn't.' Bill 167 defeat was major disappointment for Boyd”, The Lawyers Weekly 15:5 (2 June
1995) (QL), quotinig Boyd: “I think the perspective that someone who's a layperson, a lay advocate, a
feminist, and someone who has worked on social justice issues previous to being attorney general, is very
important to focus attention on some parts of the job that may not have had as much attention in the past,
and at a time when the general public is looking to the justice system from the perspective of: How does it
serve the general public? Is it only focused on issues that the legal profession itself is interested in, or is it
really focused on providing justice for the general population? So I think it was an ideal time for a new
perspective to come to the job.”

94

Jeremy Hainsworth, “B.C. ministry merger assailed”, The Lawyers Weekly 31:48 (27 April 2012).

95

Charter, supra note 57.

96

Vic Toews, “The Charter in Canadian Society” (2003) 19 SCLR (2d) 345 at 347–348. (Now Justice
Toews of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench.)
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See e.g. Editorial, “Consulting Unlimited”, The Toronto Star (22 February 1995) A20: “Last November,
she pronounced herself in favor of a 90-day licence suspension for drivers accused of impaired driving. But

272

UNBLJ RD UN-B

[VOL/TOME 72

that of Toews is that the Attorney General cannot properly oversee the profession,
including the law society and its enabling legislation, unless they are independent from
that profession and immune to regulation by that law society.98
The most important policy consideration is that a lawyer is more likely to
understand and appreciate the unique role of the Attorney General than a non-lawyer.
Such an understanding and appreciation is even more important when they are crossappointed to other portfolios and in jurisdictions where public safety remains part of
the Ministry of Justice, as their other duties and pressures can interfere with their duties
as Attorney General.99 Particularly concerning is a non-lawyer Premier who appoints
themself as Attorney General, as did E.C. Manning of Alberta in 1955.100 Puzzlingly,
Manning would later observe that “I felt that if anybody was going to serve as Attorney
General who was not a lawyer, there would be more public acceptance of it if I did it
myself as premier.”101 Such a dual portfolio can be disastrous for the rule of law even
where the Premier and Attorney General is a lawyer, as demonstrated by the conduct
of Quebec’s Maurice Duplessis in the classic case of Roncarelli v Duplessis.102 While
Attorney General for Ontario, Ian Scott wrote in 1989 that “[i]t is understood in our
province that the attorney general is first and foremost the chief law officer of the
Crown, and that the powers and duties of that office take precedence over any others
that may derive from his additional role as minister of justice and member of
Cabinet.”103 This understanding is all the more important when the Attorney General
holds other portfolios.
In sum, while the Attorney General should arguably be a lawyer as a matter
of policy, at least as a general rule, that argument is contested. Moreover, even if that
argument is correct, it does not follow that the Attorney General must be a lawyer as
a matter of law. Indeed, Askin holds the opposite. Nonetheless, there are significant
adverse legal consequences to the appointment of a non-lawyer Attorney General.
Most concerning for governments is that solicitor-client privilege may not apply. In
Boyd - not a lawyer herself - said she just wanted to have her legal advisers double-check the
constitutionality of the idea, even though Manitoba already has implemented it.”
98

See e.g. Martin, “Immunity”, supra note 72 at 437, 438.

99

See e.g. Murphy, supra note 27 at 9.

100

See e.g. Kilgour, supra note 24 at 141 (mentioning Manning but not acknowledging any concern).
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Brian Brennan, The Good Steward: The Ernest C. Manning Story (Calgary: Fifth House 2008) at 126.
See also Barry L Strayer, Canada’s Constitutional Revolution (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press,
2013) at 8: “It was said of Mr. Manning, who of course was not a lawyer, that he did not have enough faith
in any lawyer to entrust him with the role of Attorney General.”
102

Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689, concerning Quebec Premier and Attorney
General Maurice Duplessis, as noted e.g. in Huscroft, supra note 25 at 132, n 29. See also Keating, supra
note 41 at 16:33 to 16:35. For a detailed analysis, see Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Premier Should Not
Also Be the Attorney General: Roncarelli v Duplessis Revisited as a Cautionary Tale in Legal Ethics and
Professionalism” (2021) 44 Man LJ [forthcoming].
103

The Honourable Ian Scott, “Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General: Constancy and Change
in the 1980s” (1989) 39:2 UTLJ 109 at 122.
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contrast, what should be most concerning for the public, and most concerning for
legislatures and governments insofar as their role is to protect the public interest, is
that the law of lawyering does not fully apply, if it applies at all.
Part 3: Options for reform
As I explained in Parts 1 and 2, Askin – even if correctly decided – has undesirable
legal and policy consequences. In this Part, I consider options for reform. Insofar as
the holding in Askin is an application of the Crown prerogative, there is no legal
impediment to legislatures changing the law through legislation. Thus the adverse
legal consequences of Askin can be fixed. Further, the recognition of a constitutional
convention that only lawyers be appointed as Attorney General would address the
adverse policy consequences.
One option, as always, is to do nothing. As described above,104 the most
serious legal consequence of a non-lawyer Attorney General for the government is
Dodek’s argument that solicitor-client privilege does not apply. However, there is as
yet no case in which this argument has been accepted. Moreover, counterarguments
are available. The other legal consequences of Askin may be unimportant or not
pressing, at least to legislators. This do-nothing option is the easiest but is certainly
not recommended.
A second and superficially simple option is to require by statute that the
Attorney General be a lawyer in good standing with the provincial law society. Indeed,
Power explains that such amendments were proposed, but rejected, in Alberta in the
late 1930s.105 This option would fix the legal consequences of Askin. However, this
option leaves no recourse in situations where there are no lawyers in the caucus of the
governing party. Moreover, this option would compromise the freedom of the Premier
to select their Cabinet, which freedom is desirable in itself and, regardless, is central
to the Canadian system of responsible government. The Premier may have good – or,
admittedly, bad – reasons to choose a non-lawyer Attorney General. While Keating
suggests that if no lawyer-legislator is available, a lawyer who is not an elected
legislator can be appointed Attorney General,106 I disagree that such an appointment
could be reconciled with responsible government.107 (Such an appointment would be
less problematic if the position of Attorney General were removed from Cabinet, but
such a reform is well beyond the scope of this article.)

104

See above note 66 and accompanying text.
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Power, supra note 30 at 417.
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Keating, supra note 41 at 52:12 to 52:29.
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See e.g. Steele, supra note 5 at 8: “It is constitutionally permissible to appoint non-MLAs to Cabinet, but
that option creates a raft of other issues having to do with responsible government.”
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A third option, and one that would fix the legal consequences of Askin
without impeding the freedom of the Premier to select their cabinet, is both to require
the Attorney General to be a lawyer in good standing with the provincial law society
and to require the law society to admit any person appointed as Attorney General. One
model here is the Ontario Barristers Act, which provides that the federal or provincial
Attorney General may join the Ontario bar without meeting the admission
requirements,108 but does not require the federal Attorney General or provincial
Attorney General to do so. If the goal post-Askin is to ensure that the non-lawyer
Attorney General is bound by the law of lawyering, it is not enough to allow the
Attorney General to become a lawyer; instead, the Attorney General must be required
to become a lawyer.109
I recognize that a requirement to admit the non-lawyer Attorney General is,
at least at first glance, an imposition on the independence of the law society. However,
recall that the non-lawyer Attorney General practices law.110 From this perspective,
imposing this requirement on the law society merely completes, or fills a gap in, its
statutory mandate to regulate the practice of law in the public interest and ensures it
can meet that mandate. Indeed, without such a requirement, the law society is
prevented from meeting – or, more cynically, permitted to abdicate – its statutory
mandate. In terms of the regulation of the profession and the law of lawyering, it is
better that the Attorney General be a completely unqualified lawyer than a non-lawyer.
I argue that the best option is a fourth one: to amend provincial legislation to
deem that the Attorney General is a member of the corresponding law society so long
as they remain Attorney General. This option would fix the legal consequences of
Askin without in any way impeding the freedom of the Premier to select their Cabinet,
while impairing little if at all the independence of the law society or compromising the
qualifications required to become a lawyer.
108

Barristers Act, RSO 1990, c B.3, s 1, as amended by Accelerating Access to Justice Act, 2021, Sched 1,
s 1. Note that prior to this amendment in April 2021, this provision oddly applied only to the federal Attorney
General and not the provincial Attorney General. The addition of the provincial Attorney General to this
provision, as well as the larger issue of non-lawyers Attorney General, was largely ignored during the
legislative debates, although one opposition legislator did ask “Why give the Attorney General that power?
How does it serve the people of this province?” – though the question was left unanswered: Ontario,
Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 42-1, No 228 (1 March 2021) at 11660
(Catherine Fife), online: <www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-documents/parliament-42/session1/2021-03-01/hansard> [Fife] (See also Fife’s unanswered questions about how the provision was related
to the purported topic of the bill, i.e. access to justice: 11657, 11660).
109

I note here that, based on the wording of the Barristers Act, supra note 108, there is some residual
uncertainty over whether an Attorney General admitted under that provision would be subject to the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the law society (although on reflection I think that uncertainty was overblown):
Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Implications of Federalism for the Regulation of Federal Government
Lawyers” (2020) 43:1 Dal LJ 363 at 385–386 [Martin, "Federalism”]. While that uncertainty was raised in
the context of the federal Attorney General, now that this provision has been extended to apply to provincial
Attorneys General, the same uncertainty would apply to provincial Attorneys General called under that
provision.
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An important consequence of making or deeming the non-lawyer Attorney
General a lawyer is that they would have an identifiable duty to encourage respect for
the administration of justice.111 For my purposes, it is worth emphasizing that this duty
does not prohibit criticism of lawyers, judges, or courts – indeed, it may often require
such criticism.112 Instead, this duty mandates only that such criticism be fair “bona fide
and reasoned”, not “petty, intemperate or unsupported”.113 While a naïve romantic
might hope that all politicians would do so, this expectation seems appropriate of at
least the Attorney General. The professional duty of civility would likewise apply to
such criticism, at least nominally.114 Post-Groia, however, litigation is not a “tea
party”115 to which a robust expectation of civility applies – and if anything, politics is
less likely to attract a robust expectation of civility than litigation. There is thus little
reason to suspect that a non-lawyer under my proposals will enthusiastically embrace
their newfound duty of civility. However, the existence of a duty to encourage respect
for the administration of justice has normative force in itself – even if that duty remains
unenforced.
One seemingly problematic consequence is that, if made or deemed a lawyer,
the non-lawyer Attorney General would have a professional duty of competence – a
duty it would seem they have no chance of fulfilling themself.116 However, the nonlawyer Attorney General, like all lawyers, can fulfill their duty of competence by
“obtain[ing] the client’s instructions to retain, consult or collaborate with a lawyer who
is competent for that task”.117 Thus, their lawyers can assist them in fulfilling that duty
of competence. Importantly, fulfilling this duty requires the non-lawyer Attorney
General to consider the advice of their lawyers, and apparently to follow that advice
unless they have a good basis for rejecting it.
Perhaps the most undesirable consequence of deeming or making the nonlawyer Attorney General into a member of the law society is that they would have the
right to appear as counsel in court. They should resist that temptation. Indeed, even a
lawyer appointed Attorney General must be thoughtful and deliberate in their court
111

FLSC Model Code, supra note 73, r 5.6-1.
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Ibid, r 5.6-1, commentary 3.
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is abusive, offensive, or otherwise inconsistent with the proper tone of a professional communication from
a lawyer.”
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be — tea parties.” Although, as a potential floor, see Karahalios v Conservative Party of Canada, 2020
ONSC 3145 at para 262: “Litigation is not an MMA match where one calls out his opponent and dares him
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appearances.118 Any such appearance by a non-lawyer Attorney General would
suggest at least hubris, if not, as Justice Rosenberg (writing extrajudicially about
lawyer Attorneys General) warned, that they are “[u]sing the court process to push a
personal or political agenda”.119
If the chilling effect of law society jurisdiction over the Attorney General is
considered a legitimate concern, then one of these options could be combined with an
immunity provision like that on the Attorney General under the Ontario Law Society
Act.120 This combination would solve the problem of solicitor-client privilege without
subjecting the Attorney General to that part of the law of lawyering that is enforced by
the law society.
What about federally? The implications of Askin are less of a concern
federally because, as a matter of federalism, provincial law cannot require the Attorney
General for Canada – or indeed any person providing legal services to the federal
government – to be a lawyer.121 While Parliament could displace the prerogative and
require the federal Attorney General to be a lawyer, i.e. to be a member of a provincial
bar, Parliament would have no power to concomitantly require any provincial bar to
admit them as one. Nonetheless, section 1 of the Ontario Barristers Act guarantees the
admission of the federal Attorney General to the Ontario Bar. Parliament could deem
or require the Attorney General to be a lawyer, at least for the purposes of matters
within federal jurisdiction, which deeming or requirement under section 91(8) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 – federal power over officers and employees of the federal
government – would likely prevail over provincial legislation via paramountcy.122
Indeed, as at the provincial level, my recommendation is that Parliament adopt
legislation deeming the Attorney General for Canada to be a member of at least one
provincial or territorial bar. Given that the seat of government is Ottawa, and that the
Ontario Barristers Act allows the federal Attorney General to become a member of the
Ontario bar, it might appear to make the most sense for Parliament to choose the
Ontario bar. However, to ensure the law of lawyering applied to the Attorney General
evenly across the country, the best approach would be for Parliament to deem the
Attorney General to be a member of every provincial and territorial bar.
The modified Barristers Act approach – in which the law society is required
to admit the Attorney General and they are required to join it – has both advantages
and disadvantages insofar as the Attorney General remains a member of the law
society after they cease to be Attorney General, at least until they apply for permission
to surrender their license. An advantage is that the law society has regulatory and
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disciplinary authority over them while they are Attorney General and retains that
authority after they leave the portfolio.123 In contrast, under the deeming approach,
they would be removed from law society jurisdiction by ceasing to be Attorney
General. This difference admittedly may be an insignificant or largely hypothetical
one, given the reality that law societies seem unlikely to discipline Attorneys General
regardless.124 (A slightly more complex legislative solution would be to specify that
the law society retains permanent disciplinary jurisdiction over conduct while deemed
to be Attorney General.) Under either approach, however, courts would maintain
authority over any breaches of law by the non-lawyer Attorney General, such as a
breach of their lawyerly fiduciary duty to the client, even after they cease to be
Attorney General.
On the other hand, a disadvantage to this modified Barristers Act approach is
that, after leaving office, the former Attorney General has the lifetime ability to
practice law despite having no legal training – posing a substantial risk to potential
clients. This lifetime ability to practice law could also be seen as a gratuitous, arbitrary,
and undeserved “perk”,125 which is the antithesis of my purpose. Indeed, if this
granting of a “perk” to non-lawyer Attorneys General was the intended purpose of this
amendment to the Barristers Act, as suggested during the legislative debates,126 then
with respect the government and the Attorney General either overlooked or did not
appropriately appreciate the important legal issues and law society independence
considerations involved – as well as the importance of the public understanding and
perception of the motivation and rationale for this change.
Another option would be to split the roles of the Minister of Justice and
Attorney General,127 and to only require or deem the latter to be a member of the law
society. As Adam Dodek argues, “[w]e need to have a minister of justice who is
responsible for justice policy in the same way that the minister of health is responsible
for health policy. But it is not apparent that we need a lawyer in this role any more
than we need a doctor as minister of health, a farmer as minister of agriculture or a
teacher as minister of education.”128 While this splitting at the federal level was not
endorsed in the recent Review of the Roles of the Minister of Justice and Attorney
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General of Canada,129 it warrants careful consideration both federally and
provincially. Under this approach, the Attorney General could be subject to law society
authority, for the necessary reasons explained above, while the Minister of Justice
could be free from that authority, avoiding the accompanying constraints.
As for the policy consequences of Askin, here Askin’s constitutional
convention argument is intriguing and potentially effective. A constitutional
convention that only lawyers be appointed as Attorney General would recognize the
applicable policy considerations without making them legally enforceable, while
serving as a strong signal to premiers that there may be political fallout for appointing
a non-lawyer. Any premier who concluded that the appointment of a non-lawyer was
the best option despite this disincentive would be free to choose that option. The
prerogative power would thus be constrained as a matter of politics but not as a matter
of law. Alongside my other recommendations, legislatures should consider adopting
legislation or passing motions purporting to recognize a constitutional convention that
only lawyers be appointed as Attorney General. While the formal recognition of a
constitutional convention is a matter for the courts,130 such a declaration by the
legislatures would be meaningful evidence in itself.
Reflections and conclusion
In this article I have analyzed the legal and policy consequences of the non-lawyer
Attorney General. In doing so, I both demonstrated that Askin has received little
attention in the case law and the literature and argued that it warrants more. Aside from
the weaknesses in its reasoning, Askin has problematic legal implications. Chief
among these implications is the non-application of solicitor-client privilege and of the
law of lawyering. The best way to overcome the legal implications of Askin without
affecting the freedom of the Premier to choose their cabinet is to amend provincial
legislation to deem that the Attorney General is a member of the provincial law society
so long as they hold that portfolio. (At the federal level, Parliament should likewise
legislatively deem the Attorney General for Canada to be a member of all provincial
and territorial bars.) This approach is preferable to the guaranteed but voluntary call
in the Ontario Barristers Act, which among other things does not require the nonlawyer Attorney General to join the law society, detracts from the independence of the
law society to control admission to the bar in the public interest, and can be seen as
granting an arbitrary and gratuitous lifetime perk.131 The intention of my
recommendations is not to benefit the non-lawyer Attorney General but to protect the
interests of the government as client, the public interest, and the ability of the law
society to fulfill its statutory mandate.
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Indeed, to leave the law societies unable to regulate non-lawyer Attorneys
General is to hobble their ability to protect the public interest and public confidence in
the administration of justice. To insert the law societies, at least in theory, into politics
in this way is admittedly inconvenient if not dangerous for the independence and selfregulation of the legal profession – law societies may indeed be “content” with the
status quo.132 Nonetheless, the ability to regulate all Attorneys General is ultimately
unavoidable to properly fulfill law societies’ statutory mandate. Under any approach,
the law societies seem in reality unlikely to investigate or discipline the non-lawyer
Attorney General – or for that matter, any Attorney General. While that reality is
disillusioning, I leave that disillusionment for another day.
The importance of the changes I have recommended is nonetheless much
more than symbolic. The largely theoretical potential for discipline is not the only
driver for compliance with legal obligations; there is a normative and political force
to those obligations. As John Edwards observed in a slightly different context, the
ultimate backstop for any Attorney General to act properly is their character and
integrity.133 This reality is, if anything, even more true for a non-lawyer Attorney
General. To subject the non-lawyer Attorney General to the professional and legal
obligations of all lawyers is, one would hope, to impress those obligations upon their
integrity. If nothing else, there could potentially be political ramifications if a nonlawyer Attorney General did not meet these obligations. Such ramifications would be
reinforced by recognizing a constitutional convention that only lawyers be appointed
as Attorney General.
In any case, legislative clarity that these obligations apply to the non-lawyer
Attorney General, via a clear statement of the legislature on behalf of the public, is a
first step in actualizing them and raising public expectations. Such legislation would
emphasize that the legislature will (or can or should) hold even the non-lawyer
Attorney General to a higher standard than it does other members of cabinet. It would
provide a clear and articulable basis, although some might characterize this as a figleaf, for calls for the non-lawyer Attorney General to resign.
An analogy can be drawn here to the recent recommendation by Anne
McLellan to create a special oath of office for the Minister of Justice and Attorney
General of Canada, one that would among other things explicitly acknowledge a duty
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to the rule of law.134 McLellan argued that such an oath would “clarify” the role for
the Attorney General both for herself and for others.135 The legislative amendments I
recommend would serve a similar function. I also echo McLellan’s position that such
changes are “not a purely symbolic gesture” and could, if nothing else, support the
Attorney General’s resignation after a breach.136
There is a clear role for the profession, if not the public, to push for
clarification and change. As suggested by Keating, the Canadian Bar Association and
its branches should encourage the Federation of Law Societies of Canada and its
member law societies to adopt and make public a clear position on their actual and
preferable jurisdiction over the non-lawyer Attorney General – and encourage
Parliament and the legislatures to act on the recommendations proposed above.
While the implications of Askin are problematic, my view is that an absolute
rule that only lawyers can be appointed as Attorney General would be problematic in
a different way. At minimum, Askin is problematic in that it allows the appointment
of an Attorney General who is unqualified as a matter of education, training, and
experience. While a bare requirement to be a lawyer does not guarantee much, it does
provide a minimum measure of preparation for the role. A deeper question is whether
the non-lawyer Attorney General can truly appreciate, understand, and fulfill their
duties to the rule of law – as its “protector” or “lore master”.137 The non-lawyer
Attorney General is unduly reliant on the judgment of the lawyers who advise them –
unless they reject that judgment, as espoused by Toews, which is not much better. As
Murphy notes, “the Attorney General is not merely a figurehead.”138 On the other
hand, I acknowledge the argument that a lawyer Attorney General is beholden to the
legal profession, if not to the law society itself, and cannot effectively oversee that
profession and that law society while simultaneously being a member of that
profession and a licensee of that law society. On balance, the freedom of the Premier
or Prime Minister to choose their Attorney General outweighs the benefits of requiring
them to choose a lawyer. Thus, while I agree that the Attorney General should
generally be a lawyer before their appointment, I disagree that there should be a legal
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requirement to that effect – although I do advocate the recognition of a corresponding
constitutional convention.
While there is no way to overcome the negative policy consequences of a
non-lawyer Attorney General – i.e. that they are unavoidably untrained and
unqualified in a technical sense, and their integrity has not been assessed by the
corresponding law society, and they lack a lawyer’s understanding and appreciation
of the rule of law – my proposals do overcome the legal consequences. In doing so,
they also provide a clear and objective and rigorous standard for the non-lawyer
Attorney General to meet. Premiers are free to appoint non-lawyers as Attorneys
General, and eliminating that freedom itself would be problematic. At the same time,
both appointer and appointee should bear the consequences of that choice, be they
positive or negative. The public should expect more of Attorneys General, be they
lawyers or non-lawyers, and – if nothing else – my proposal is a reasonable way to set
and affirm those expectations. It is also a clear direction to law societies that regulating
the legal profession in the public interest must mean regulating the Attorney General.
I emphasize that to leave the chief legal officer of the Crown beyond law society
authority, in law or in reality, is to require or allow law societies to abdicate their
responsibility.

